War is a very destructive human endeavour. But war is also a learning opportunity for military institutions. Many governments and institutions are watching the war in #Ukraine for insights into future competition and conflict. A thread on lessons and the war. 1/25 🧵
2/ Back in May, I explored why learning in war is so important, and explained some of the principles related to lessons and lessons learned for military organisations. You can read that post here:
3/ In the past ten months there has been a profusion of articles that propose lists of lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War. Some – from experts on war, the military, strategy and national security affairs - are well informed and cogently argued. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atla…
4/ Some, on the other hand, are biased, poorly structured, misinformation or just plain wrong (or even weird). This includes premature declarations such as ‘the death of (insert your least favourite military equipment here)’.
5/ But learning from war is a serious business that has significant consequences for military organisations if not done well. The lives of our future service personnel literally hang on how competently we learn, and adapt, from our observations of modern wars.
6/ Why should we look at lessons from war in general, and this one in particular? The answer is that our world is constantly changing. Rather than continuously making our own mistakes in responding to change, clever institutions can learn from the missteps of others.
7/ To exploit the failures of others requires a military institution to have a learning culture. As I have explored previously in my threads, the Ukrainians have demonstrated a superior learning culture in this war, and in its lead up. They learned from 2014, adapted & improved.
8/ I have explored this competitive learning environment in #Ukraine, which can be better called an adaptation battle, in several articles. engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukr…
9/ With this as context, I wanted to explore some of the better observations from the war in #Ukraine. While there is a long way to go, these provide good intellectual foundations for the lessons that military institutions will draw from the war to inform modernisation efforts.
10/ The November 2022 report from @RUSI_org is probably the best report on Ukraine war observations released thus far. rusi.org/explore-our-re…
11/ It has a particular focus on Russian operations and the integration of different force elements. Its critiques of Ukrainian operations are limited however, noting the requirement for operational security. That said, it is a very good report on initial observations of the war.
13/ And while this is not a long report, the source makes it worthy of perusing. In June this year, the Secretary of the US Army discussed five key lessons from #Ukraine. breakingdefense.com/2022/06/us-arm…
14/ The war in the air over Ukraine is worthy of additional study. There has been a lot going on with both crewed and uncrewed systems, missiles, and Ukraine’s integrated air and missile defence system. One of the better studies on this is from @RUSI_org static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air…
16/ Cyber operations, have been described by some as that dog that hasn’t barked in Ukraine. This is probably an unfair assessment – there have been cyber operations on both sides. But they are not as obvious or transparent as other aspects of the war. lawfareblog.com/cyberwar-ukrai…
17/ In June this year, Microsoft issued a report on the early lessons of cyber from the war in Ukraine. It is a good read, although should be read in conjunction with other views of the cyber war such as those from @WIRED and @TheEconomist blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/…
18/ Finally, information warfare. This war has seen widespread influence operations from both sides. It has also seen a Cambrian explosion in civil influence operations, open-source mapping and assessment, and intelligence analysis. gov.uk/government/spe…
19/ This discussion from @CSIS explores a range of observations drawn from the war in #Ukraine. The link is a transcript, but a video of the discussion is also available. csis.org/analysis/nafo-…
20/ While reviewing the many observations made of this war so far, there are 2 things to keep in mind. First, events in the coming months might change the context of these current observations. And second, even with these observations, not all military #innovation is good.
21/ We must ensure that institutional processes are informed by examples of failed lessons and failed ‘lessons learned’ processes. Examples of failed reform processes can be just as informative as successful adaptations.
22/ Earlier this year, Kendrick Kuo explored how military innovation can also hurt military effectiveness. It is a long read but contains many useful lessons for observing military affairs and drawing lessons on innovation and adaptation. belfercenter.org/publication/da…
23/ In #learning from this war, western military institutions will need to invest in – and apply – collection, analysis, dissemination, and adaptation processes. Importantly, as Don Starry described in "To Change an Army" this will require #leadership from the top.
24/ As this war continues, and both sides are adapting based on battlefield learning, their interactions with each other, and new technologies and ideas. Other clever military institutions must be watching, assessing and adapting. End.
America has just released its 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Not seeing much press activity from the Dept of Defense/War on this. While I need time to ponder the deeper implications of the document, a few things stand out on first reading. 1/11 🧵
2/ First, the document is consistent with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump Administration in November 2025. Key priorities in the NDS align with the NSS, as you would expect. However, while the NSS has priorities, the NDS has "Lines of Effort". whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
3/ There are four Lines of Effort in the new NDS:
1. Defend the U.S. Homeland. 2. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. 3. Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. 4. Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.
"The Oreshnik is the sign of a Fearful, Worried Putin, Not a Leader Confident of Victory." My first 2026 update on war and great power competition. This week: the Oreshnik attack, peace talks progress, the ground war in #Ukraine, China's reaction to Venezuela and more. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ In events related to #Ukraine this week, the Oreshnik strike absorbed a lot of attention. But this was not an event that demonstrates Russia's strength. Indeed it showed the opposite. Also, peace talks in Paris took place as did a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing.
3/ In the Pacific, China continues to posture about American operations in Venezuela. While we might like to think that China will practice what it preaches with regards to its statement that “military means are not the solution to problems”, its accelerating use of military coercion and aggression against neighbours shows just how hollow and hypocritical the Xi regime is.
Also this week, Trump discussed Taiwan in his New York Times interview.
On 29 December, just as the summit between Zelenskyy and Trump was finishing at Mar-a-lago, the PLA Eastern Theatre Command announced that it had commenced exercise "Justice Mission 2025" in the #Taiwan Strait. I have just published an assessment of what China designed it to achieve, and how we can learn from it. 1/8 🧵🇹🇼
2/ Exercise Justice Mission 2025 has taken place at multiple locations around Taiwan. While the maps demonstrate the physical environment of the exercise, the more important exercise “location” is the minds of Taiwanese and foreign observers. But perhaps the most important exercise location is the mind of the U.S. president. (Map: @TaiwanMonitor)
3/ The exercise will have been designed by the Chinese with multiple objectives beyond the normal political coercion of Taiwan. These objectives include:
-rehearsing military activities for different Taiwan contingencies, including decapitation operations.
-continue developing the skills of the commanders, staff, units and overall command and control of the Eastern Theatre Command.
-assess the response of Taiwanese and American political and military systems.
-normalise large joint operations around Taiwan.
Putin can play Trump like a fiddle. But the bigger issue is that Putin has clearly decided that continuing the war in #Ukraine - while keeping Trump on side - is more advantageous to him (for now) than agreeing to any peace deal. This is a deliberate Russian provocation to get Ukraine-haters worked up and undermine the peace process. 1/6 🧵
2/ Putin has wasted no time in making his views on the current 20-point plan clear. He does not like it, but needs to keep Trump from placing more sanctions on Russia. If the current peace plan isn’t dead, it may be on life support. Will Trump hold Putin to account for this however?
3/ And today, Putin held a carefully scripted ‘military update’ with senior military commanders to further shape the minds of decision makers Washington DC, Beijing and elsewhere around Russia’s inevitable victory. The key theme - everything is going well, the enemy (Ukraine) is doing badly and we must continue fighting to ‘liberate the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia.
The much-anticipated summit between the leaders of #Ukraine and America, held at President Trump’s #Mar-a-Largo resort, has just concluded with a press conference. A quick update on outcomes. 1/15 🧵🇺🇦
2/ This is the latest meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy since Trump returned to the White House in early 2025. Some of the meetings did not go well, such as the now-infamous 28 February Oval Office meeting. Others just kicked the can down the road, such as the Alaska Summit.
3/ In the lead up to the meeting, Ukraine released details of a 20-point peace plan that would be discussed with the Trump administration, and then potential presented to the Russians. The draft plan covered multiple subjects, including security guarantees for Ukraine, Ukrainian membership of the EU, reconstruction and territory.
Also, Trump had a 2.5 hour phone conversation with Putin - a call that was as long as today's main meeting between Ukraine and the US.
I recently returned from another research visit to #Ukraine, my second for 2025. I have written a new white paper, published by the @CSIS, which explores 7 strategic insights based on knowledge gained on my recent visit & other research. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ The white paper covers a range of subjects related to how #Ukraine and #Russia are fighting this war. The seven insights not only illuminate the state of the war, and the degree of learning and #adaptation occurring, they provide lessons that western military institutions must analyse and heed.
3/ The seven subjects covered are:
1. Drone saturation and Russian drone innovation. 2. The new tactical battle triangle. 3. The ongoing and accelerating adaptation battle. 4. Long-range strike operations. 5. Ground-based air defence. 6. Russia's tactical and strategic advantages. 7. War strategy and trajectory.